What China’s New ODI Rules Mean for Multinational Companies
China’s 2026 ODI Regulation does not directly regulate foreign companies, but it significantly impacts multinationals by tightening rules on data transfers, technology collaboration, and geopolitical risk exposure in China-related operations. This is Part II of our series on China’s 2026 Outbound Investment Regulation.
China’s new Regulation on Overseas Investment (State Council Decree No. 837, effective July 1, 2026) is primarily directed at Chinese outbound investors. But its consequences extend well beyond them.
For multinational companies operating in China, sourcing from Chinese suppliers or partnering with Chinese enterprises globally, the regulation reshapes the commercial and compliance environment in ways that demand strategic attention. The indirect effects on data flows, technology collaboration, geopolitical exposure, and competitive dynamics are likely to prove as consequential as the direct obligations placed on Chinese investors themselves.
Cross-border collaboration becomes more complex
One of the most immediate commercial impacts flows from Article 13, which prohibits Chinese entities from exporting or transferring restricted technology, data, and services abroad, including through mechanisms such as technical training, cross-border staffing, and remote technical assistance.
Article 13 of China’s 2026 ODI Regulation
When carrying out outbound investment activities, investors shall not export or use goods, technologies, services, or related data that are prohibited for export under state regulations, nor shall they, without authorization, export or use goods, technologies, services, or related data that are subject to export restrictions. Investors shall not transfer to other countries (regions) any goods, technologies, services, or related data that are prohibited for export by means such as cross-border deployment of technical personnel, organizing personnel to work abroad, providing cross-border technical guidance, or arranging cross-border training. Nor shall they, without authorization, transfer to other countries (regions) any goods, technologies, services, or related data that are subject to export restrictions.
For multinational companies, this changes, and in some cases formalizes, the calculus of working with Chinese partners. Joint ventures, technology licensing arrangements, and cross-border research and development programs that once proceeded with limited friction will now require Chinese counterparties to assess whether the activity triggers export control approvals or data compliance requirements. It’s expected that Chinese partners will introduce new contractual provisions such as compliance review clauses, data non-transfer provisions, and technology compartmentalization arrangements that lengthen negotiation timelines and constrain what was previously standard practice.
The practical consequence is not that collaboration becomes impossible, but that it becomes slower, more legally layered, and more sensitive to the specific nature of the technology and data involved. For technology-intensive multinationals, particularly in semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, cloud services, and life sciences, this friction could be material.
The constraints on cross-border data flows increase
Article 22 is where the regulation most directly intersects with multinational compliance operations. It restricts Chinese entities from providing data, evidence, or materials to foreign judicial or enforcement bodies without complying with China’s domestic legal requirements, including laws on state secrets, data security, personal information protection, and export controls. Where Chinese regulatory approval is required before data leaves the country, that process must be followed regardless of what a foreign court, arbitral tribunal, or regulator demands.
This creates a structural compliance conflict that many multinationals already navigate in practice, but which is now explicitly codified. When a foreign antitrust regulator, a US FCPA investigation, or an international arbitration panel requires a multinational to produce data from its Chinese operations, the company faces competing legal obligations that cannot both be fully satisfied. The result is what might be called a permanent “data wall” between China operations and global headquarters, not as a practical workaround, but as a legally mandated reality.
For compliance and legal teams, this has direct operational implications. Internal investigation protocols, cross-border discovery procedures, and litigation hold processes that assume seamless data access across jurisdictions need to be rebuilt around a China-specific architecture. Companies that have not yet invested in localized Chinese compliance infrastructure, from separate data governance and locally empowered legal teams to jurisdiction-specific incident response procedures, may face increasing exposure on both sides of the wall.
Geopolitical risk is now a structural business variable
Articles 23 through 25 introduce what amounts to a codified framework for economic countermeasures. Where foreign governments impose discriminatory restrictions on Chinese enterprises, including through export controls, investment screening, or sanctions, China’s regulatory authorities are now empowered to respond with measures that can include prohibiting targeted foreign entities from investing in China, restricting their ability to transact with Chinese companies, and limiting market access. The commercial significance of this provision is that it institutionalizes the transmission of geopolitical risk from the state level to the enterprise level.
A multinational company that plays no role in its home country’s policy decisions toward China nonetheless becomes a potential target of responsive measures if its government is deemed to have acted adversarially. In legal form, the mechanism mirrors the kinds of pressure that have already been applied informally in recent years.
For multinationals, this requires geopolitical scenario planning to become a core element of China strategy, not an occasional executive conversation, but a structured risk management process. Companies need to map their exposure to potential countermeasure scenarios, understand which of their China-dependent business lines are most vulnerable, and develop contingency frameworks that do not assume business continuity under deteriorating bilateral relations.
At the same time, the regulation introduces greater clarity and predictability into areas that were previously governed by fragmented rules and informal practice. For multinational companies, this may reduce uncertainty over how Chinese partners approach compliance, even as it raises the overall regulatory threshold.
What should multinationals do now?
Rather than creating direct legal obligations for foreign companies, the 2026 ODI Regulation changes the environment in which they operate, and that change calls for concrete responses.
The first priority is compliance architecture. Companies with significant China operations should audit their cross-border data flows, technology-sharing arrangements, and investigation protocols against the new framework. This is mainly to understand where their Chinese partners and counterparties will face new constraints.
The second is contractual adaptation. Joint venture agreements, technology licensing terms, and supply arrangements that predate the regulation may no longer reflect the compliance realities of Chinese partners. Reopening these agreements to address data transfer provisions and compliance cooperation mechanisms is overdue for many companies.
The third is scenario planning. The geopolitical countermeasure provisions reflect an operational toolkit that Chinese authorities can deploy. Companies that have not stress-tested their China exposure against realistic deterioration scenarios are carrying unpriced risk.
The regulation takes effect on July 1, 2026. While it introduces new complexity, it also provides a clearer framework for managing cross-border investment risks. The window to prepare is narrow, and companies are advised to act now.
How Dezan Shira & Associates can help
Navigating the evolving ODI framework requires an integrated approach to compliance, risk management, and cross-border structuring. Dezan Shira & Associates supports multinational companies in assessing the impact of regulatory changes on China-related operations, including reviewing data flows, technology-sharing arrangements, and investment structures. Our team advises on strengthening governance and compliance systems, adapting contractual frameworks, and developing practical strategies to manage regulatory risks in China and across Asia. To arrange a consultation, please contact our local team here.
Whether launching, restructuring, or expanding, we ensure our clients benefit from coordinated input across legal, HR, tax, and financial teams. From startup to exit, our advisory scales with your business—designed to meet both immediate needs and long-term goals.
About Us
China Briefing is one of five regional Asia Briefing publications. It is supported by Dezan Shira & Associates, a pan-Asia, multi-disciplinary professional services firm that assists foreign investors throughout Asia, including through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong in China. Dezan Shira & Associates also maintains offices or has alliance partners assisting foreign investors in Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, India, Malaysia, Mongolia, Dubai (UAE), Japan, South Korea, Nepal, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Italy, Germany, Bangladesh, Australia, United States, and United Kingdom and Ireland.
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